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A common concern with self-reports of personality traits in selection contexts is faking. The 
multidimensional forced-choice (MFC) format has been proposed as an alternative to rating 
scales (RS) that could prevent faking. The goal of this study was to compare the 
susceptibility of the MFC format and RS format to faking in a simulated high-stakes setting 
when using normative scoring for both formats. Participants were randomly assigned to three 
groups (total N = 1,867) and filled out the Big Five Triplets once under an honest instruction 
and once under a fake-good instruction. Latent mean differences between the honest and 
fake-good administrations indicated that the Big Five domains were faked in the expected 
direction. Faking effects for all traits were larger for RS compared to MFC. Faking effects 
were also larger for the MFC version with mixed triplets compared to the MFC version with 
triplets that were fully matched regarding their social desirability. The MFC format does not 
prevent faking completely, but it reduces faking substantially. Faking can be further reduced 
in the MFC format by matching the items presented in a block regarding their social 
desirability. 
Keywords: forced-choice; rating scale; faking; social desirability; response format; 
Thurstonian item response model 
Public significance statement: This study showed that it was harder for respondents to 
intentionally distort their responses when the questionnaire used a response format in which 
statements are ranked compared to a format in which statements are rated individually. The 
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forced-choice ranking format was especially effective at reducing faking when the statements 
presented together were about equally desirable.   
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Personality traits predict important life outcomes including occupational attainment, 
mortality, and divorce (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). For example, in 
the work domain, conscientiousness predicts job performance incrementally over cognitive 
ability (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Consequently, there is an interest in assessing personality 
traits in selection contexts, in particular to inform hiring decisions. In the clinical domain, 
self-reports of personality are used to inform the diagnosis and classification of personality 
disorders (Oltmanns & Widiger, 2018; Widiger & Samuel, 2005). However, a common 
concern is that self-reports of personality can be intentionally distorted by applicants and 
patients and that this in turn can bias selection and diagnostic decisions (Dilchert, Ones, 
Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006; Goffin & Christiansen, 2003; Griffith, Chmielowski, & 
Yoshita, 2007; MacCann, Ziegler, & Roberts, 2011). For example, patients may distort their 
scores to achieve a particular diagnosis or compensation. With the most common response 
format used in self-report personality questionnaires - items presented as single stimuli that 
are responded to using a rating scale with several ordered categories - this concern is well-
founded because it can be rather obvious to applicants which response category is the 
desirable choice. For example, with the conscientiousness item I plan ahead and the response 
options strongly disagree – disagree – agree – strongly agree, it is quite obvious to 
applicants that agree or strongly agree are the desirable responses. To mitigate this concern, 
the forced-choice format has been proposed as an alternative to rating scales that might be 
resistant or at least less susceptible to faking (e.g., Dilchert & Ones, 2011).  
The forced-choice format 
In the forced-choice (FC) format, two or more items are presented simultaneously to 
respondents (see example in Figure 1). In the simplest case, only pairs of items are presented 
and respondents select the item that describes them better. Other variants of the FC format 
present more than two items in an item block such as triplets or quads. Respondents then 
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either rank all items according to how well they describe them or select one that describes 
them most and one that describes them least. The items presented in one block either measure 
the same trait (unidimensional FC) or different traits (multidimensional FC; MFC). In our 
study, we applied a Big Five instrument with multidimensional triplets using a full ranking 
instruction, the Big Five Triplets (Wetzel & Frick, 2020).  
When scored conventionally by using ranks as item scores, FC measures result in 
ipsative or partially ipsative scores that only allow intraindividual comparisons and distort 
correlation-based analyses such as reliability coefficients, factor analyses, and correlations 
with criteria (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2018a; Hicks, 1970). The degree of ipsativity can 
be reduced by, for example, including negatively-keyed items, resulting in partially ipsative 
scores that nevertheless retain some ipsative constraints. However, recent model 
developments in the framework of item response theory allow deriving normative scores 
from FC data, thereby making interindividual comparisons possible. For an overview over 
the different item response models see Brown (2016). In this study, we applied the 
Thurstonian item response model (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011), an item response 
model that can readily be estimated using popular software1. In the Thurstonian item 
response model, ranks are coded into binary outcome variables from all pairwise comparisons 
between the items in the block. The model parameters can be estimated from the binary 
outcome variables using limited information methods (for details see Brown & Maydeu-
Olivares, 2011; 2012; 2018a). The FC format has been shown to have similar or even better 
criterion-related validity than the rating scale (RS) format (Bartram, 2007; Lee, Lee, & Stark, 
2018; Salgado & Táuriz, 2014; Wetzel & Frick, 2020; Wetzel, Roberts, Fraley, & Brown, 
 
1 For more information on how to estimate the Thurstonian item response model, see Brown 
and Maydeu-Olivares (2012). A tutorial and Excel macro for creating the Mplus syntax can 
be found on http://annabrown.name/software. 
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2016; Zhang et al., 2019), while generally having lower reliabilities given the same items as 
their single-stimulus counterparts (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2018b).  
The rationale behind using the FC format as a method of preventing faking is that 
when the items in a block are matched with respect to their desirability, applicants cannot 
fake all equally desirable and relevant items. In contrast, in the RS format, applicants only 
need to identify the most desirable response option for each individual item.  
Previous research on faking in the forced-choice format 
Previous research has found that the FC format is less susceptible to faking at the 
level of group mean differences (Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery, 2005; Heggestad, 
Morrison, Reeve, & McCloy, 2006; Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 2000). For example, 
Christiansen et al. (2005) showed that means on conscientiousness and extraversion were 
elevated in both formats when participants were instructed to imagine applying for a sales 
position compared to when they filled out the questionnaire under an honest instruction. 
Importantly, however, the mean differences between honest and fake-good conditions were 
larger for the RS format (Cohen’s d of 0.68 and 0.74) than for the MFC format (Cohen’s d of 
0.40 and 0.47). Furthermore, in a second study, Christiansen et al. found that MFC scores in 
the fake-good condition (applying for a customer service position) correlated moderately with 
performance ratings by supervisors whereas there was no relation for RS scores. Heggestad et 
al. (2006) also found smaller differences between honest and fake-good conditions for MFC 
compared to RS with the exception of conscientiousness, where the effect was similar for 
both formats. However, Heggestad et al. also conducted individual-level analyses, such as 
comparing the rank ordering of participants between a Big Five questionnaire completed in 
honest and faking conditions, and found that the correspondence in rank ordering was not 
better for MFC than RS.  
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A recent meta-analysis showed that the overall effect size for faking of FC measures 
was d = 0.06 (Cao & Drasgow, 2019), with effect sizes varying between 0 for neuroticism 
and openness and 0.23 for conscientiousness. These effect sizes are substantially smaller than 
those reported for RS measures, which ranged from 0.11 for extraversion to 0.45 for 
conscientiousness in a meta-analysis by Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, and Smith 
(2006). However, most of the 43 studies included in Cao and Drasgow’s meta-analysis used 
pairwise comparisons and only one study used a full ranking format. Furthermore, most of 
the previous research used ipsative or partially ipsative scoring, rather than IRT-based 
normative scoring. Thus, more research on faking applying other variants of the FC format 
(e.g., triplets with full ranking) and normative scoring is needed.  
The present study 
The goal of this study is to compare the susceptibility of the MFC and RS format to 
explicit faking in a simulated high-stakes scenario when using normative scoring for both 
formats. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three versions of the Big Five Triplets 
(Wetzel & Frick, 2020): MFC-matched (all triplets consisted of items of equal desirability), 
MFC-mixed (7 triplets contained a desirable item in addition to two neutral or undesirable 
ones), and RS. They first filled out the respective Big Five Triplets (BFT) version under an 
honest instruction and later under a fake-good instruction. Our analyses address four research 
questions: 1) Does less faking occur in the MFC format compared with the RS format when 
both formats are scored normatively? 2) Does the degree of faking occurring in the MFC 
format depend on whether the items in a block are matched on desirability? 3) Does faking 
reduce criterion-related validity and – if yes – does the reduction in criterion-related validity 




This study extends previous research in several important ways: First, we consistently 
used normative scoring for both MFC and RS data whereas previous research confounded the 
response format with the scoring method - normative scoring was used for RS and ipsative or 
partially ipsative scoring for FC. Thus, it is unclear from previous research whether 
differences in the susceptibility to faking were due to the response format or the scoring 
method. As more and more MFC assessments apply IRT-based scoring, the effects of faking 
need to be investigated on the actual assessment scores. Thus, our study applies modern 
scaling methodologies to both MFC and RS to allow a fair comparison of their susceptibility 
to faking. Second, we designed two versions of our MFC instrument: one in which all triplets 
were carefully matched regarding their desirability and one in which some triplets contained 
items that differed in their desirability. This allowed us to test directly whether matching by 
desirability is a feasible strategy to reduce faking. In contrast, some previous studies mixed 
desirable and undesirable items within blocks and did not include a fully matched version. 
However, MFC questionnaires are argued to be less fakable only when items are matched. 
Third, we applied triplets with a full ranking instruction whereas most previous research 
applied forced-choice pairs. Triplets with full ranking are popular in MFC assessments 
because they yield more reliable scores than pairs when the number of items is held constant 
(Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2018a)2. Triplets might be harder to fake than pairs because 
with three statements, it might be harder to decide on the order of desirability than with pairs. 
Fourth, we also obtained data on criteria which allowed us to compare whether criterion-
related validities for MFC and RS are differentially affected by faking. Importantly, most of 
 
2 Triplets with full ranking are more informative than pairs because the ranks can be broken 
down into three pairwise comparisons (Item A vs. Item B, Item A vs. Item C, Item B vs. Item 
C). This is how MFC data are analyzed in the Thurstonian item response model (Brown & 
Maydeu-Olivares, 2011), which appears to correspond to the underlying response process 
(Sass, Frick, Reips, & Wetzel, 2018). Thus, with triplets, three bits of binary information on 
participants’ trait levels are obtained with each item block whereas only one bit of binary 
information is obtained with a pair when each item is presented only once. 
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these criteria were not measured with RS, thereby reducing common method bias between 
criteria and traits for RS. Fifth, a subsample of our participants filled out an intelligence test, 
allowing us to investigate whether the ability to fake successfully is related to intelligence in 
the MFC and RS format, a research question that has not been addressed with normatively 
scored MFC data. 
Hypotheses 
We preregistered the following hypotheses3 on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/gk3js): 
H1: Trait estimates on the Big Five with the faking instruction will differ from the ones with 
the neutral instruction in the direction of lower neuroticism, higher extraversion, higher 
agreeableness, higher conscientiousness, and higher openness for both the MFC and RS 
formats. 
H2: The MFC format will be less susceptible to faking than the RS format; i.e., the 
differences predicted in H1 will be larger for the RS format. 
H3: Within the MFC format, the differences predicted in H1 will be larger for the MFC-
mixed socially desirable version than the MFC-matched socially desirable version. 
Exploratory analyses 
 
3 We had originally planned to also investigate socially desirable responding in a low-stakes 
context with the following two preregistered hypotheses:  
H1: In the MFC-mixed socially desirable (SD) version, the mean rank of the socially 
desirable option will be higher than the mean rank of the respective (neutral or socially 
undesirable) option assessing the same trait in the MFC-matched SD version. 
H2: In the RS version, the mean rating of the socially desirable items will be higher than the 
mean rating of the respective items that are neutral or socially undesirable. 
We later realized that social desirability could be confounded with item difficulty in these 
analyses and a higher endorsement of the socially desirable items could not be interpreted 
unambiguously as socially desirable responding, but could also reflect differences in item 
difficulty. We therefore decided not to report these analyses in the main text. However, they 
are available from osf.io/7dmj9 for interested readers. The hypotheses on faking were re-




In addition to testing the hypotheses described above, we also conducted two 
exploratory analyses. First, we compared the validity of the Big Five for predicting a number 
of criteria from different areas (e.g., social activities, health, and cognitive ability) between 
the honest and fake-good condition within each format. If scores on the Big Five are distorted 
by faking, predictive validity should be worse in the fake-good condition than in the honest 
condition. We then compared the difference in criterion-related validities between honest and 
fake-good across response formats. Second, we investigated whether the ability to fake 
successfully (faking ability) was related to general intelligence. Faking ability was 
operationalized 1) by the degree to which a respondent’s ranks (MFC) or ratings (RS) aligned 
with the ideal ranks and ratings to fit the personality profile described in the faking scenario 
and 2) by the sum of each respondent’s trait estimates in the fake-good condition.  
Method 
The study design and analysis plan were preregistered (https://osf.io/gk3js). This 
study was exempt from approval by an ethics committee. 
Study design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three response format groups: MFC-
matched, MFC-mixed, and RS. The MFC-matched group filled out the original version of the 
Big Five Triplets (BFT; Wetzel & Frick, 2020), in which all triplets are matched with respect 
to their social desirability. The MFC-mixed group filled out an altered version of the BFT in 
which one item in the seven triplets containing items rated as socially undesirable or neutral 
was replaced by a socially desirable item (see below). The RS group filled out the items from 
BFT-matched and the additional socially desirable items from BFT-mixed presented as single 
stimuli with a rating scale. After being assigned to one of the three response format groups, 
participants first filled out the BFT in the respective format. Then, they responded to a 
number of questions relating to social activities, health, abilities, and other variables for a 
10 
 
study comparing validity between MFC and RS (Wetzel & Frick, 2020). The criterion 
variables will also be analyzed in this study to compare the predictive validity between the 
honest and the fake-good instruction. Next, participants filled out other personality 
questionnaires for the same study on validity. Then, they received a fake-good instruction and 
filled out the BFT again in the same version as at the beginning. After the end of the survey, 
participants in the laboratory subsample could optionally take a short intelligence test. Lastly, 
they were debriefed about the purposes of the data collection.  
Sample 
 The data for this study came from two subsamples, one laboratory sample and one 
Internet access panel sample. The laboratory sample consisted of 1,042 persons from two 
German universities. They could choose between being remunerated with research 
participation credit or money (between 8 and 15 Euros depending on the length of the 
session). Participants who took the intelligence test could receive feedback on their scores. 
The Internet access panel sample (N = 1,217) was collected with Respondi, a German 
company. Respondi participants once register to the panel and are then invited to selected 
studies via email. For our study, only participants who were between 18 and 30 years old and 
whose first language was German were invited. Of the originally 1,217 participants, 91 were 
redirected without completing the study because they did not fulfill the age or language 
inclusion criteria or they participated after the quota for gender (50% female) was full. 
Participants in the access panel sample received 4 Euros for their participation. In both 
subsamples, we excluded some participants based on data quality checks (response time 2 SD 
below the average, incorrect responses to instructed response items), which led to the final 
sample sizes of 910 for the laboratory sample and 957 for the access panel sample, 
respectively. More detailed information on data exclusions and the demographic make-up of 
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the subsamples is available in Wetzel and Frick (2020)4. The complete sample across all three 
response format groups thus consisted of 1,867 persons. Of these, 593 participants were in 
the MFC-matched group, 652 were in the MFC-mixed group, and 622 were in the RS group. 
The demographic characteristics of participants in the three groups are provided in Table 1.  
Measures 
  We only describe the measures relevant to this study in the following. For a 
description of other administered measures (personality questionnaires assessing the Big 
Five, HEXACO, and Dark Triad), see Wetzel and Frick (2020). 
 Big Five Triplets. The BFT was used to assess the Big Five domains neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. In the original 
version of the BFT (BFT-matched), all triplets are matched regarding their social desirability. 
Matching was based on social desirability ratings of all 213 items in the initial item pool 
obtained from a sample of 33 psychology students prior to test construction. Raters were told 
“Socially desirable means that the trait or behavior described in the statement fulfills societal 
norms and expectations.” The instruction included three example items, one socially 
desirable, one neutral, and one socially undesirable item. For example, the item “In the bus I 
offer my seat to old people.” was presented. It was then explained to participants that most 
people would consider this a behavior that fulfills societal norms and expectations and the 
item should consequently be rated as “socially desirable.” The interrater reliability for the 
desirability ratings was excellent (ICC(1,k) = 0.99).  For a more detailed description of the 
development of the BFT including a table of the items’ mean desirability ratings, see Wetzel 
and Frick (2020) and https://osf.io/ft9ud/. The BFT in German and English can be 
 
4 Wetzel and Frick (2020) only analyzed data from the MFC-matched and RS groups from 
the first administration of the BFT with an honest instruction. There is no overlap in research 
questions or analyses with this study with the exception of the comparison of the predictive 
validity between honest and fake-good condition, which also uses the criterion-related 
validities from the honest instruction for MFC-matched and RS (see also below). 
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downloaded from https://osf.io/ft9ud/. In the BFT, neuroticism is assessed with 16 items, 
extraversion with 13 items, openness with 10 items, agreeableness with seven items, and 
conscientiousness with 14 items. BFT-matched showed good convergent validity with the 
Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), except for agreeableness (see Wetzel 
and Frick, 2020, for a thorough investigation of construct and criterion-related validity). The 
matching procedure resulted in three types of triplets: triplets in which all items are socially 
undesirable, triplets with only neutral items, and triplets with only socially desirable items 
(see Figure 2 for examples of the three types). To construct BFT-mixed, we replaced one 
item in all the socially undesirable and neutral triplets with a socially desirable item. For 
example, in the triplet I am not interested in other people’s problems – I am a loner – I 
dislike myself, we replaced the extraversion item (I am a loner) with I warm up to others 
quickly. In total, we replaced seven items: two on agreeableness, two on extraversion, two on 
conscientiousness, and one on neuroticism. Thus, BFT-matched and BFT-mixed are identical 
with the exception of these seven socially desirable items. Since items were presented as 
triplets, this implies that seven triplets differed between BFT-matched and BFT-mixed. For 
BFT-RS, the BFT-matched items plus the seven socially desirable items were presented 
individually (three per page) and participants were instructed to rate them on a four-point 
rating scale with the categories strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree. Empirical 
reliabilities for maximum a posteriori trait estimates on the Big Five from the honest 
instruction ranged from 0.68 (agreeableness) to 0.84 (conscientiousness) for BFT-matched, 
from 0.70 (agreeableness) to 0.84 (extraversion) for BFT-mixed and from 0.79 
(agreeableness) to 0.91 (neuroticism and extraversion) for BFT-RS (see Table S1 in the 
supplemental online material). 
 Intelligence. Intelligence was assessed with the numeric module of a modular short 
intelligence test (Modularer Kurzintelligenztest, M-KIT; Dantlgraber, 2015), which is the 
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module that loads most strongly on the g factor. Scores on the numeric module ranged from 4 
to 31 with a mean of 19.02 (SD = 4.68) and an omega total reliability of 0.79. Intelligence 
was operationalized as an observed sum score in all models. 
Criteria. Table 2 shows the criteria and how they were assessed and Table S2 in the 
supplemental material shows descriptive statistics for the criteria. Participants responded to 
questions on criteria from five areas: social activities, health, charity, cognitive abilities, and 
other variables.  
Fake-good instruction 
 For the fake-good instruction, we asked participants to imagine that they were 
applying to the Master’s program of the Department of Psychology at a university in 
Germany. This scenario was realistic for the largest group in our laboratory sample who were 
psychology undergraduates (38%)5. The instruction read: 
Universities have to select students into their programs based on certain criteria. 
Besides cognitive abilities, personality profiles also play a major role in the selection 
of candidates. Personality instruments such as the following are administered to 
candidates during the selection process. Please imagine that your goal is to be 
admitted as a student to the Master’s program of the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Konstanz. The Department of Psychology is looking for students who 
are conscientious, reliable, extraverted, and emotionally stable. An ideal candidate 
would, for example, be punctual and assertive, and would complete assignments on 
time. He/she should be interested in people and be characterized by curiosity and 
creativity. Furthermore, the Department of Psychology is looking for students who 
 
5 In Germany, almost all psychology undergraduate students have the goal of continuing to 
obtain a Master’s degree because there is practically no job market for people with only a 
Bachelor’s degree in psychology (Antoni, 2019).  
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are optimistic and purposefully pursue their academic goals. At the same time, they 
should be balanced, gregarious and helpful, and show compassion with others. 
Please fill out the following questionnaire in a way that fulfills these criteria in order 
to increase your chances of being admitted to the Master’s program. 
Thus, we instructed participants to fake all Big Five domains by making themselves more 
emotionally stable, more extraverted, more open, more agreeable, and more conscientious. 
Analyses 
  Personality traits were modeled as latent variables in the framework of item response 
theory. We applied the Thurstonian item response model (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011; 
2013) for MFC data and the graded response model (Samejima, 1969) for RS data. The 
models were estimated using unweighted least squares with mean- and variance-corrected 
Satorra-Bentler goodness-of-fit tests (ULSMV) in Mplus version 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998-2018). Observed scores were used to model criteria with the exception of life 
satisfaction, which was modeled as a latent variable.  
Faking. To test our hypotheses on faking (H1 to H3), we first estimated latent mean 
differences between data from the honest instruction and data from the fake-good instruction 
for the three groups (MFC-matched, MFC-mixed, RS). This was done in two steps. First, we 
estimated item parameters in the appropriate model (Thurstonian item response model or 
graded response model) with the data from the honest instruction. In this first step, means of 
the latent traits were fixed to 0 and variances to 1. In the second step, we modeled the data 
from the fake-good instruction with item parameters fixed to those from the model with the 
data from the honest instruction. This was necessary to ensure that the measured constructs 
were on the same scale. Without fixed item parameters, it would not be possible to directly 
compare the latent traits from the first application of the BFT with an honest instruction to 
those from the second application with the fake-good instruction. This is because when 
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participants respond honestly, we should be measuring the Big Five. However, when they 
fake, the latent traits reflect what participants consider to be the ideal responses in the context 
of the faking scenario. Thus, if the goal is to compare mean levels on the latent traits between 
the two applications, it is essential to ensure that the measured traits are on the same scale, 
which is achieved by fixing the item parameters in the faking model to those from the honest 
model6. Further, this procedure mimics applied contexts, where traits for individuals are 
estimated from item parameters obtained a priori. In the model with the data from the fake-
good instruction, means and variances of the latent traits were freely estimated and the means 
directly correspond to the difference between the honest and the fake-good instruction.  
 To test H1 on whether the Big Five were faked in the expected direction, we tested 
whether the size of the latent mean difference for each trait was at least small according to 
Cohen’s (1988) criteria (d ≥ |0.20|). H2 and H3 were tested by comparing the latent mean 
differences in d between MFC-matched and RS (H2) and MFC-matched and MFC-mixed 
(H3), again applying Cohen’s criteria for at least small differences.  
Comparison of predictive validity. As an additional (not preregistered) exploratory 
analysis, we compared the predictive validity of the Big Five between honest and fake-good 
instructions within each response format and descriptively also across response formats. First, 
five experts in the area of personality psychology rated for which of the 20 criteria listed in 
Table 2 they expected a latent correlation > |.15|, with .15 as the cut-off for a small latent 
correlation (Gignac & Szodorai, 2016). We used the modal ratings as hypothesized criterion-
related correlations. Criterion-related correlations were estimated in separate models for the 
 
6 Note that this goal would not be achieved by imposing measurement invariance across the 
data from the two instructions because the measured constructs differ fundamentally. It is 
therefore unlikely that even configural invariance would exist and constraining item 
parameters to equality across the two instructions would result in item parameter estimates 
that cannot be interpreted. Investigating measurement invariance could be used as a tool to 
investigate faking at the item-level, but would probably distort comparability between honest 
and fake-good person scores. 
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data from the honest instruction and the data from the fake-good instruction. In these models, 
we also included the other (non-hypothesized) correlations between the Big Five and the 
criteria in order to compare them with the hypothesized criterion-related correlations. In this 
analysis, the item parameters in the faking models were also fixed to those from the honest 
models. We then computed the average criterion-related validity and the average across the 
other correlations for each instruction × response format combination. We only compare the 
correlations descriptively because we did not formulate any a priori hypotheses for this 
research question.   
Faking ability. Lastly, we were interested in whether participants’ ability to fake 
successfully (their faking ability) was related to intelligence. We operationalized faking 
ability in two ways. First, as the Mahalanobis distance between participants’ fake-good Big 
Five profile and an ideal Big Five profile based on expert ratings and second, as the sum of 
the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates on the Big Five from the fake-good 
administration. With respect to the first method, to obtain the ideal profile, experts were 
instructed to rank/rate the items in the way that best fulfilled the faking instruction. They 
were allowed to consult the faking instruction the entire time while providing 
rankings/ratings for the ideal profile. We then used the modal rank/rating across experts to 
obtain the final ideal profile. In the MFC-format, this sometimes resulted in multiple modes 
for an item (e.g., if three raters ranked it second and three raters ranked it third)7. If the ranks 
for the other two items in the triplet were unambiguous, the third item received the remaining 
rank. For two triplets, there was no clear mode for more than one item. The authors resolved 
these cases by discussion. MAP estimates for the Big Five were obtained from a model with 
 
7 Three experts rated/ranked the ideal profile for RS and the undesirable and neutral triplets in 
MFC-matched, but six experts ranked the ideal profile for MFC-mixed (including the 
overlapping triplets with MFC-matched). Thus, multiple modes could only occur in the 
MFC-format. Multiple modes occurred for 14 items. 
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the fake-good data in which item parameters were fixed to those from the respective honest-
instruction model. To obtain MAP estimates for the expert-specified ideal profile, we used 
the item and trait parameters from the fake-good model estimated with only the real 
participants. We then calculated the Mahalanobis distance between the participants’ MAPs 
and the ideal case MAPs and correlated it with the participants’ scores in the intelligence test. 
The second way in which we operationalized faking ability was as the sum of the MAP 
estimates on the Big Five from the fake-good administration, with neuroticism reversed. This 
sum was then correlated with intelligence test scores. 
Besides Mplus, we also used the following R (R Core Team, 2018) packages in data 
analysis: BSDA (Arnholt & Evans, 2017), compute.es (Re, 2013), lattice (Sarkar, 2008), 
MplusAutomation (Hallquist & Wiley, 2018), and psych (Revelle, 2018). 
Results 
Faking 
 We only evaluated the fit of the models with the data from the honest instruction 
because the models with the data from the faking instruction had fixed item parameters. 
According to the RMSEA, the MFC-matched and MFC-mixed models showed an excellent 
fit (0.036 and 0.038, respectively) and the RS model showed an acceptable fit (0.062). The 
SRMR and CFI indicated an acceptable to slightly below acceptable fit for all models (see 
Table S3). First, we checked whether the Big Five were faked in the expected direction. This 
was the case for all Big Five domains and all response format groups except agreeableness in 
MFC-matched (see Figure 3 and Table 3), overall confirming H1. Thus, when instructed to 
present themselves favorably in order to be admitted to the Master’s program in psychology, 
participants distorted their responses to appear more emotionally stable, more extraverted, 
more open, more agreeable, and more conscientious compared to when they filled out the 
BFT honestly. Effect sizes for the hypothesized changes ranged from d = 0.24 (95% CI = 
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[0.12; 0.35]) for openness to experience in MFC-matched to d = –1.38 (95% CI = [–1.51; –
1.26] for neuroticism in RS8. The variance in trait estimates was smaller under the fake-good 
instruction than the honest instruction for MFC for all traits except conscientiousness in 
MFC-matched. For RS, the opposite was the case with larger variances under faking than 
honest responding for all traits except agreeableness. We additionally checked how much 
variance there was in the ranking patterns for MFC and in the response distributions for RS 
under the honest versus fake-good instruction. The variance was smaller under the fake-good 
instruction for the majority of triplets (17 out of 20 for MFC-matched and 18 for MFC-
mixed) and items (54 out of 67 for RS). Furthermore, correlations between MAPs from the 
honest instruction and the fake-good instruction were only low to moderate (range from .13 
to .36 for MFC-matched, .14 to .23 for MFC-mixed, and .19 to .31 for RS). Thus, when 
faking, participants showed less variance in their responses and changed their rank ordering.   
 The latent mean differences between honest and fake-good were larger for RS than 
MFC-matched for all Big Five traits with moderate to large effect sizes (absolute differences 
in Cohen’s d ranged from 0.49 for extraversion to 0.93 for agreeableness), which confirms 
H2. Next, we compared MFC-matched and MFC-mixed. For extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness, the traits for which socially undesirable or neutral items were replaced 
with socially desirable ones, the latent mean differences between honest and fake-good were 
larger for MFC-mixed compared to MFC-matched with small effect sizes for extraversion 
(0.38) and conscientiousness (0.21) and a moderate effect size for agreeableness (0.67). For 
 
8 Because the scenario was especially relevant for psychology students and Ziegler (2007) 
showed that psychology majors tend to fake other aspects than students from other majors, 
we also did an exploratory investigation of the faking effects in the subsample of psychology 
students. Due to the small sample sizes (Ns between 107 and 120 for the three groups), we 
did not estimate new models, but rather used MAPs from the models with the full sample. 
Consistently across the three formats and in line with Ziegler’s results, psychology students 
faked neuroticism and conscientiousness more strongly than the full sample (e.g., d = –1.38 
for neuroticism and d = 0.92 for conscientiousness for MFC-matched). There were no 
systematic differences for the other traits (see Table S4). 
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neuroticism and openness, which were identical between MFC-matched and MFC-mixed, 
latent mean differences between honest and fake-good administrations went in the direction 
of stronger faking for MFC-mixed than MFC-matched, but were negligible in terms of effect 
sizes. Thus, overall, H3 was confirmed. 
 In an exploratory analysis suggested by a reviewer, we additionally compared the 
actual faking levels (Cohen’s d between honest and fake-good instruction) with ideal faking 
(Cohen’s d between honest instruction and the expert-rated ideal profile) using MAPs. Ideal 
faking thus represents the amount of change in scores we would expect if participants did not 
respond in accordance with their own trait levels at all, but only followed the faking 
instruction. Absolute Cohen’s d values were larger for ideal faking than actual faking in 
almost all cases (see Table S5). For example, for conscientiousness, Cohen’s d for actual 
faking was 0.47 for MFC-matched, 0.63 for MFC-mixed, and 1.62 for RS, whereas Cohen’s 
d for ideal faking was 0.74 for MFC-matched, 0.78 for MFC-mixed, and 3.06 for RS. In 
addition, Cohen’s d values for ideal faking were substantially smaller for MFC than RS, 
indicating that the MFC format was also less susceptible to faking when experts filled out the 
questionnaire following the instruction meticulously.     
Criterion-related validity 
 Latent criterion-related correlations ranged from 0 for neuroticism with smoke 
(yes/no) in MFC-matched (honest instruction) to –.67 for neuroticism with life satisfaction in 
MFC-mixed (honest instruction; see Table 4). Number of cigarettes a day was removed due 
to estimation problems which can probably be attributed to the small sample sizes for this 
criterion (between 72 and 74 for the three groups). The full correlation table is depicted in 
supplementary Table S6. The average criterion-related correlation across all expert-
hypothesized relations under the honest instruction was .19 (95% CI = [.12; .25]) for MFC-
matched, .26 [.18; .33] for MFC-mixed, and .22 [.14; .29] for RS. Under the fake-good 
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instruction, average criterion-related correlations were reduced to around .10 for all groups9. 
Average criterion-related correlations under the honest instruction were larger than the 
average over the other (non-hypothesized) correlations for all groups and the average of the 
other correlations did not differ between the honest and the fake-good instruction (all 
averages were between .09 and .12). In sum, instructed faking reduced the criterion-related 
validities for all response format groups about equally.   
Faking ability and intelligence 
 The Mahalanobis distance between participants’ fake-good Big Five profile and the 
ideal Big Five profile correlated at approximately r = 0 with their score in the short 
intelligence test for MFC-matched (r = –0.01) and MFC-mixed (r = 0.03). In the RS group, 
the correlation was slightly below small (cutoff = |.10| for observed correlations; Gignac & 
Szodorai, 2016) at r = –0.09. The sum of the MAP estimates from the fake-good 
administration did not correlate with intelligence test scores in the MFC-matched group (r = 
–0.04), but showed a small correlation in the MFC-mixed group (r = 0.11) and an almost 
small correlation in the RS group (r = 0.09). Thus, the results on whether faking ability is 
related to intelligence were inconclusive. 
Discussion 
 In this study, we compared the susceptibility of the MFC and RS format to faking in a 
simulated high-stakes setting. In the following, we will first discuss our results on faking. 
Then, we will discuss the important issue of matching items regarding their desirability. 
Lastly, we will discuss the effects of faking on criterion validity in the two formats before 
noting limitations of our study and future directions.  
 
9 We checked whether results differed when the item parameters were freely estimated in the 
models with the faking data. This was not the case. Average criterion-related validities were 
practically identical as those reported above at .10 for MFC-matched, .08 for MFC-mixed, 
and .09 for RS. 
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Intentional faking in a simulated high-stakes setting 
Our hypotheses regarding the latent mean differences between honest and fake-good 
conditions were confirmed. Thus, participants adhered to the fake-good instruction and 
described themselves as more emotionally stable, more extraverted, more open, more 
agreeable, and more conscientious compared to when they were responding honestly. The 
only exception to this pattern was that there was no mean difference between honest and 
fake-good for agreeableness in MFC-matched. This result is possibly due to issues with the 
construct validity of agreeableness in the matched version of the BFT (see Wetzel & Frick, 
2020). The effect sizes of our latent mean differences between honest and fake-good were 
overall moderate to large, which is typical for simulated faking designs whereas effect sizes 
would be expected to be smaller in real settings (Holden & Book, 2011; Smith & Ellingson, 
2002).   
One difference to previous research on faking of the Big Five is that in our study 
neuroticism was faked more strongly than conscientiousness whereas in meta-analyses on 
faking in the MFC format and the RS format, conscientiousness was the trait with the 
strongest faking effects (Birkeland et al., 2006; Cao & Drasgow, 2019). The faking 
instruction included three keywords related to neuroticism and five related to 
conscientiousness, indicating that an imbalance in the faking instruction was probably not the 
reason. One possible reason is that there were more neuroticism items than conscientiousness 
items (16 vs. 14), giving participants more opportunity to fake neuroticism. 
 The comparison of the two MFC versions with the RS version showed that faking 
effects were larger in the RS version for all Big Five domains. Thus, in line with previous 
research (Cao & Drasgow, 2019; Christiansen et al., 2005; Heggestad et al., 2006; Jackson et 
al., 2000), we found that the MFC format, while not being completely faking-resistant, is 
substantially less susceptible to faking than the RS format. Therefore, in assessment contexts 
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in which faking is a concern, such as personnel selection or clinical diagnosis, using the MFC 
format can be recommended. This statement can be further qualified by our finding from the 
comparison between the MFC-matched and the MFC-mixed version of the BFT: The BFT 
version that contained only fully matched triplets regarding the items’ desirability (MFC-
matched) showed smaller latent mean differences between honest and fake-good instructions 
than the BFT version that contained seven mixed triplets (MFC-mixed). Thus, careful 
matching of the items presented in triplets regarding their social desirability can further 
reduce faking in the MFC format (see also Cao & Drasgow, 2019). We now turn to the issue 
of how this matching can be achieved. 
Matching of items with respect to desirability 
Different methods exist for matching items regarding their desirability. One method is 
to match items based on their item means from an administration in the RS format (Jackson 
et al., 2000; Watrin, Geiger, Spengler, & Wilhelm, 2019). In this case, the item means are 
interpreted as the popularity and therefore desirability of the items. Another method is to 
obtain ratings of the desirability of the items and to match items with similar desirability 
(Christiansen et al., 2005; Converse et al., 2010; Edwards, 1953; Heggestad et al., 2006; 
Jackson et al., 2000). In our study, we chose the latter approach and obtained explicit ratings 
of the social desirability of all items in our pool prior to constructing the BFT. Then, we 
combined items to triplets that had the same social desirability rating. While matching based 
on item means might be simpler, it neglects that an item’s mean does not purely reflect its 
desirability, but rather prevalence of the behavior, which is influenced by many factors. Other 
research has shown that applicants are able to identify selection criteria (Klehe et al., 2012) 
and two items with equivalent means (‘difficulties’ in item response theory terms) but from 
different traits can differ in desirability when one is more relevant to the assessment.  
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One disadvantage of both matching methods is that they assume that item desirability 
stays the same when items are presented together in one block. However, items having 
similar desirability in the RS format or identical social desirability ratings does not guarantee 
that they will be perceived as equally desirable when they are presented together in one 
block. In the context of our method, it is possible that items that were all individually rated as 
socially desirable, such as those in the right triplet in Figure 2, are perceived as differing in 
their social desirability when presented simultaneously. As Feldman and Corah (1960, p. 
480) put it: “single statements may acquire contextual meaning when paired; hence their SD 
[social desirability] values may be somewhat altered.” The process of responding to MFC 
triplets involves weighing the items in the triplet against each other before assigning them 
ranks (Sass et al., 2018), and fine-grained differentiations regarding desirability could be a 
part of this comparison (Kahneman, 2011). As Lin and Brown (2017) showed, differences in 
perceived social desirability can occur with different arrangements of items to blocks and this 
can influence the items’ psychometric properties. Thus, the question of how to best match 
items in MFC test construction is still unanswered. Other methods could be explored such as 
obtaining comparative ratings of the items’ social desirability prior to assembling the triplets 
(e.g., presenting different combinations of pairs of items and asking experts to rate whether 
one is more desirable or whether they are equally desirable). Future research could therefore 
compare different methods of matching items by desirability and investigate which method 
achieves the best match, for example in terms of reducing faking effects.  
It has been suggested that matching by desirability in the MFC format is only possible 
with equally-keyed items because with mixed-keyed items, participants will easily realize 
which items are positively keyed and prefer those (Bürkner, Schulte, & Holling, 2019). To 
our knowledge, no empirical evidence has been offered for this claim. Following test 
construction guidelines for the MFC format (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011), we 
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combined positively and negatively-keyed items in all BFT triplets but one. This was 
possible because positively and negatively-keyed items were rated as having equal 
desirability. Our empirical data indicate that participants did not always prefer the positively-
keyed items. For example, in the triplet consisting of I tend to be very particular about things 
– I stay in the background – I have a vivid imagination, the negatively-keyed extraversion 
item (I stay in the background) received a median rank of 2 under the honest instruction and 
was ranked first by 33% of the participants. This indicates that it is possible to match by 
desirability even with mixed-keyed items. Nevertheless, future research could further 
investigate matching by desirability with mixed-keyed items and whether ranking patterns are 
related to the keying of the items in a block. 
 Another difficulty with item matching is that socially desirable responding and faking 
are context-dependent. The faking profile will differ depending on the specific faking 
instruction. For example, Pauls and Crost (2005) found markedly different faking profiles 
depending on whether participants were instructed to generally fake good, imagine they were 
applying for a position as a manager, or imagine they were applying as a nurse. Thus, the 
more far-reaching question is whether it is at all possible to achieve a matching that is valid 
across contexts, or whether it would be necessary to adapt the matching of items to each 
specific context. Converse et al. (2010) showed that different instructions in obtaining 
desirability ratings (general desirability, general job applicant, real estate job applicant, police 
officer job applicant) resulted in different instrument versions. However, when the faking 
instruction only matched for the police officer job applicant scenario, instrument versions 
based on desirability ratings for the other two job applicant scenarios did not perform notably 
worse than the police officer instrument version (Converse et al., 2010). In contrast, stronger 
faking effects were found for the instrument version based on general desirability ratings. 
Thus, when the goal is to apply an instrument in selection contexts, raters should evaluate the 
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desirability of the items in a selection context also, though it does not appear to need to be 
job-specific. In clinical settings, faking bad is more of a concern than faking good. First 
evidence indicates that the psychological processes underlying faking good and faking bad 
may differ (Bensch, Horstmann, Greiff, & Ziegler, 2019). More research is needed to 
illuminate the psychological processes underlying faking good and bad and whether general 
desirability matching is able to reduce faking bad. In our study, we applied an instrument that 
was not specifically designed for use in selection contexts, but rather more generally for 
personality assessment (Wetzel & Frick, 2020). The instruction for obtaining the social 
desirability ratings was rather broad and defined desirability as fulfilling societal norms and 
expectations. In contrast, the faking instruction painted the scenario of applying to a Master’s 
program in psychology and contained very specific trait descriptions that could be classified 
as eliciting agency management (“purposefully pursue their academic goals”) and 
communion management (“show compassion with others”) in terms of Paulhus’ (2002) two-
tier system of socially desirable responding. Nevertheless, faking was substantially reduced 
in the MFC format. It is possible that the MFC version would have been even more resistant 
to faking if the desirability ratings had been obtained for a selection context. Thus, when 
constructing an MFC instrument, the situations in which it will be applied should inform item 
matching.  
Predictive validity  
It has been argued that faking does not influence criterion validity (Ones & 
Viswesvaran, 1998; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996), though other studies have found a 
detrimental effect of faking on criterion validity (Douglas, McDaniel, & Snell, 1996; Holden, 
2007; Holden, Wood, & Tomashewski, 2001; Ziegler & Bühner, 2009). One reason for the 
inconsistent findings in previous research might be the setting and the base rate of faking 
associated with it (Holden & Book, 2011). In natural settings, only part of the respondents 
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will fake whereas in induced faking settings, all respondents compliant with the instruction 
can be expected to fake. In our instructed faking design, criterion-related validities were 
consistently worse under the faking instruction for both the MFC and the RS format. 
Furthermore, for the faking data, criterion-related correlations were indistinguishable from 
the other, non-hypothesized correlations between traits and criteria. Average criterion-related 
validities were very similar in all three groups (MFC-matched, MFC-mixed, RS), and the 
degree to which criterion-related validities were reduced in the fake-good condition was also 
approximately equal. Thus, the effects of faking on criterion validity were similar for the 
MFC and the RS format and the MFC format therefore did not show an advantage compared 
to RS, despite the overall lower degree of faking. Our instrument was the same length in both 
formats, thereby necessarily yielding lower reliability for the MFC format (Brown & 
Maydeu-Olivares, 2018b), though this should not have affected latent correlations with 
criteria. Nevertheless, future research could compare the effects of faking on criterion-related 
validity with MFC and RS instruments that have similarly high reliability. Especially for 
clinical settings, investigating predictive validity is important because personality scores are 
not used in isolation (such as for rank-ordering persons), but rather for predicting a diverse 
range of behaviors and outcomes. 
Faking ability 
A previous study by Vasilopoulos, Cucina, Dyomina, Morewitz, and Reilly (2006) 
found a relationship between cognitive ability and personality scores from a forced-choice 
measure in the faking condition, but not in the honest condition. In our study, faking ability 
was uncorrelated with intelligence when we operationalized it as the Mahalanobis distance 
between the participants’ fake-good profile and the expert-rated ideal profile. When we used 
the sum of the MAP estimates (with neuroticism reversed) from the fake-good administration 
instead, we found no correlation for MFC-matched, but a small correlation for MFC-mixed 
27 
 
and RS. It could be argued that in selection contexts in which applicants are selected in the 
order of their scores, the sum of the MAP estimates is a better measure of faking ability 
because it reflects whether participants adhered to the principle that the higher the score, the 
better. In the two versions that could be faked effectively, RS and MFC-mixed, the small 
correlation indicates that more intelligent participants tended to obtain higher scores than less 
intelligent participants and would therefore have a higher probability of being selected. The 
null correlation in MFC-matched is further evidence that the matching by desirability was 
successful. However, as these were non-preregistered, exploratory analyses, it would be 
important to replicate them before drawing any conclusions. In addition, it is possible that 
there was some variance restriction in intelligence scores because the largest group in our 
laboratory sample were psychology students, who are selected into the program by high 
school GPA and the cut-off is quite high due to a limited number of places. Furthermore, the 
intelligence test was an optional part of the laboratory session, making it possible that some 
self-selection took place. Thus, more research investigating the association between faking 
ability and intelligence in more heterogeneous samples is needed. 
Limitations and future directions 
One important limitation of our study is that participants were not really applying to 
the Master’s program in psychology, but that it was a simulated high-stakes situation. 
However, the scenario was chosen to be realistic for psychology undergraduates who formed 
38% of our laboratory sample or 19% of our full sample. Previous research, on the other 
hand, often used lower prestige jobs that do not require a college education (e.g., assembler 
and customer service representative in Study 3 in Christiansen et al., 2005) with 
undergraduate samples, leading to a lack of fit between the sample’s characteristics and the 
job descriptions in the faking scenario. Our goal was to avoid this. Nevertheless, future 
research on real applicants or patients is needed. It is very likely that smaller faking effects 
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for the MFC format will be found in real settings as has been the case for rating scales 
(Holden & Book, 2011; Smith & Ellingson, 2002).   
In our study, participants were instructed to fake all traits. Past research has shown 
that participants tend to fake only the traits that they consider relevant, for example, for a 
particular job application (Birkeland et al., 2006; Cao & Drasgow, 2019; Furnham, 1990; 
Pauls & Crost, 2005). If some traits are classified as irrelevant by applicants, it is possible 
that they will be better able to focus on faking the relevant traits, thereby potentially reducing 
the advantage of the MFC format compared to the RS format. Thus, future research could 
induce faking on only some traits in order to investigate the susceptibility of the MFC format 
to faking. In addition, future research could vary the number of traits and investigate whether 
faking effects are reduced when the number of traits is larger – perhaps combined with 
conditions in which varying numbers of traits are relevant to the assessment context. Another 
factor that can influence faking effects is interindividual differences in the tendency to fake. 
In our study, these were presumably not a relevant issue because we used an induced faking 
design and the faking instruction detailed very clearly which traits to fake in which direction. 
However, in natural settings, applicants’ tendency to fake can play an important role. Pavlov, 
Maydeu-Olivares, and Fairchild (2019) showed using a regression-based moderation analysis 
that faking was only reduced for the forced-choice format at high faking tendency levels, 
though they did not match the forced-choice items regarding desirability. This implies that 
future research conducted in natural settings should also take participants’ propensity for 
faking into account. Our faking instruction was very detailed and specific in order to reduce 
variance in participants’ interpretation or influence of prior knowledge on which traits should 
be faked in which direction. In other contexts, test takers may differ in their knowledge about 
a job or the criteria of a diagnosis. In these situations, it would also be interesting to 
investigate whether faking ability is related to crystallized intelligence. 
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The degree of faking occurring in the MFC format may also depend on the number of 
items presented in a block (pairs, triplets, tetrads, pentads) and the instruction (full ranking, 
most like me/least like me). Our study extended previous research by employing triplets with 
a full ranking instruction. Triplets have the advantage that they achieve a good balance 
between information and cognitive load. Most previous research on faking in the MFC 
format either used pairs and instructed participants to choose the response option that 
described them best (Christiansen et al., 2005; Converse et al., 2010) or used quads and 
instructed participants to choose the statement that was most like them and the one that was 
least like them (Heggestad et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2000). With more statements presented 
simultaneously and a full ranking instruction, it might be harder for respondents intending to 
fake to figure out the order of desirability. However, at the same time, it might become more 
cognitively taxing for honest participants to describe themselves accurately. Thus, future 
research could investigate whether other MFC format variants, such as quads with a full 
ranking task, are able to reduce faking effectively while still being manageable for honest 
respondents. Our study used a within-subjects design in which participants filled out the 
questionnaire both under an honest instruction and under a fake-good instruction. It is 
possible that some participants felt the need to change their responses across conditions, 
though our results are consistent with other studies that employed a between-subjects design 
(e.g., Christiansen et al., 2005; Heggestad et al., 2006).   
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, we found that the MFC format was less susceptible to faking than the 
RS format when both formats were scored normatively. This was especially the case when 
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Sample characteristics for the response format groups 
Response 
format group 
N Gender   Age 
  % female % male % 
transgender 
M (SD) 
MFC-matched 593 62.7 36.9 0.3 23.40 (4.09) 
MFC-mixed 652 65.0 34.8 0.2 23.39 (4.34) 
Rating scale 622 64.7 34.9 0.3 23.64 (4.39) 





Assessment of criteria and hypothesized relations to Big Five 
Area Criterion Question  Response Expert rating 
Big Five corr. 
Social 
activities 
Facebook user “I do not have a Facebook account.” 
was provided as an alternative response 
option to Number of Facebook friends 
Checked, not checked Extraversion 
 Number of Facebook 
friends 
“Please enter the number of your friends 
on Facebook as accurately as possible.” 
Text box Extraversion 
 Attended parties / 
month 
“On average, how many parties do you 
go to in a month?” 
Text box Extraversion 
 Number dates / month “On average, how many dates (with the 
same person or different persons) do 
you go on in a month?” 
Text box Extraversion 
 Number of persons 
dated / year 
“On average, how many persons do you 
date in a year?” 
Text box Extraversion 
Health Frequency of smoking “How often do you smoke cigarettes?” Never, less than once a 
month, 1 – 3 times a month, 
1 – 3 times a week, on 4 -6 
days a week, every day 
Neuroticism, 
Conscientiousness 
 Number of smoked 
cigarettes / day 
“How many cigarettes do you smoke on 
average a day?” 
This question was only presented if a 
person selected “every day” to the 
previous question. 
Text box Neuroticism, 
Conscientiousness 
 Frequency of drinking 
alcohol 
“How often do you consume alcoholic 
beverages?” 
Never, £ once a month, 2 – 
4 times a month, 2 – 3 times 
a week, ³ 4 times a week 
Extraversion, 
Conscientiousness 
 Life satisfaction Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) 
7-point scale from do not 





 Exercise regularly “Do you exercise regularly (at least 
once a week)?” 
Yes, no Conscientiousness 
Ability GPA “What is your current GPA?” Text box Conscientiousness 
 Intelligence  Numeric module Modularer 
Kurzintelligenztest (Dantlgraber, 2015) 
 - 
Charity Donated blood “Have you ever donated blood?” Yes, no Agreeableness 
 Charity work “Do you do any charity work in social 
organizations?” 
Yes, no Agreeableness 
 Voluntary social year “Did you do a voluntary social year 
after graduating from high school?” 
Yes, no Agreeableness 
Other Number times traveled 
abroad > 1 month 
“How many times did you travel abroad 
for longer than one month after 
graduating from high school?” 
Text box Extraversion, 
Openness 
 Punctuality Research assistants noted the time 
participants arrived for the lab session.  
0 = unpunctual, 1 = 
punctual 
Conscientiousness 
 Job “Do you have a job?” Yes, no Conscientiousness 
 Play instrument “Do you play an instrument?” Yes, no Openness 
 Engage in extreme 
sports 
“Do you engage in extreme sports such 
as paragliding?” 
Yes, no Extraversion 
Note. Corr. = correlation. The last column indicates which Big Five domain the respective criterion was hypothesized to correlate with 




Latent mean differences between honest and fake-good instructions with 95% CI  
Format Trait Latent mean 
difference  
SD Cohen’s d 
MFC-matched Neuroticism -0.63 [-0.71; -0.54] 0.82 -0.77 [-0.89; -0.65] 
 Extraversion 0.40 [0.32; 0.49] 0.78 0.52 [0.40; 0.63] 
 Openness 0.23 [0.13; 0.33] 0.97 0.24 [0.12; 0.35] 
 Agreeableness -0.05 [-0.15; 0.05] 0.59 -0.09 [-0.20; 0.03] 
 Conscientiousness 0.47 [0.36; 0.58] 1.17 0.40 [0.29; 0.52] 
MFC-mixed Neuroticism -0.80 [-0.89; -0.71] 0.84 -0.95 [-1.06; -0.83] 
 Extraversion 0.62 [0.54; 0.69] 0.69 0.90 [0.78; 1.01] 
 Openness 0.30 [0.20; 0.40] 0.90 0.33 [0.22; 0.44] 
 Agreeableness 0.58 [0.47; 0.69] 1.01 0.58 [0.47; 0.69] 
 Conscientiousness 0.59 [0.49; 0.68] 0.96 0.61 [0.50; 0.72] 
Rating scale Neuroticism -2.16 [-2.30; -2.02] 1.56 -1.38 [-1.51; -1.26] 
 Extraversion 1.34 [1.23; 1.45] 1.32 1.01 [0.89; 1.13] 
 Openness 1.05 [0.94; 1.17] 1.25 0.84 [0.72; 0.96] 
 Agreeableness 0.82 [0.71; 0.93] 0.98 0.84 [0.73; 0.96] 




Criterion-related validities for the three response format groups under honest and fake-good 
administrations 
  MFC-matched Rating scale MFC-mixed 












Neuroticism Frequency of smoking 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.09 
 Life satisfaction -0.44 -0.24 -0.65 -0.21 -0.67 -0.29 
Extraversion Facebook user 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.09 0.22 0.09 
 Number of Facebook 
friends (log) 
0.50 0.11 0.43 0.23 0.46 0.19 
 Attended 
parties/month 
0.48 0.16 0.49 0.22 0.53 0.21 
 Number dates/month 0.13 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.34 0.14 
 Number of persons 
dated/year 
0.16 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.35 0.06 
 Frequency of drinking 
alcohol 
0.33 0.20 0.29 0.14 0.32 0.10 
 Number times traveled 
abroad > 1 month 
0.07 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.24 0.07 
 Engage in extreme 
sports 
0.21 0.04 0.21 -0.08 0.19 0.17 
Openness Number times traveled 
abroad > 1 month 
0.15 0.12 0.18 0.02 0.07 -0.04 
 Play instrument -0.03 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.05 
Agreeable-
ness 
Donated blood 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.05 
Charity work 0.04 0.10 0.36 0.20 0.20 0.07 




Frequency of smoking -0.19 -0.07 -0.19 -0.07 -0.21 0.05 
Frequency of drinking 
alcohol 
-0.27 0.07 -0.19 0.06 -0.28 0.03 
 GPA -0.14 -0.15 -0.05 -0.12 -0.18 -0.05 
 Exercise regularly 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03 
 Punctuality -0.16 -0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.36 -0.11 
 Job -0.10 0.13 0.04 0.13 -0.06 0.14 
Note. Number of Facebook friends was analyzed as a log-transformed variable. The criterion 
















Figure 3. Latent mean differences in Cohen’s d between the honest and the fake-good instruction 
for the three response format groups. MFC = multidimensional forced-choice, RS = rating scale, 
N = neuroticism, E = extraversion, O = openness to experience, A = agreeableness, C = 
conscientiousness. 
 
